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*P.L. 582 The Cabinet Office Review1 proposal for an integrated service of public sector ombudsmen
in England is a welcome development in rationalising the present system. That the various
ombudsmen schemes may need “joining up” in the future was recognised some 25 years ago by Sir
Alan Marre, the Parliamentary Ombudsman at the time. He considered that, in the long term,
consideration would need to be given to how a more co-ordinated total system, more directly related
to the interests of the public, could be brought about.2 This idea was examined in 1988 by JUSTICE,3
in a report which explored whether there should be an integrated service, under which all the
ombudsmen would operate under the same legislation. Their decision however was against
recommending the creation of a single scheme. More recently, the Select Committee on Public
Administration considered that there was a need for greater coherence to the structure of the public
sector complaints system. It recommended a review of the system, with a view to bringing the
complaints authorities together.4
This present Review was prompted by the three Local Government Ombudsmen and the Health and
Parliamentary Ombudsman, who, in October 1998, presented a joint paper to Ministers, suggesting
that a comprehensive review was timely, on the basis that the existing boundaries between their work
no longer reflected service delivery in the public sector. In March 1999, the Government announced a
review by the Cabinet Office. Its terms of reference were to consider whether the present
organisational arrangements for the public sector ombudsmen were in the best interests of
complainants and others, given the moves towards integrated provision of public services. It was also
to consider the interaction between these ombudsmen and other independent complaints authorities.
The report was published on April 13, 2000.
The present system
The origins of the present system are normally associated with an inquiry by JUSTICE, which
concluded that an ombudsman should be appointed to investigate complaints of maladministration.5
The recommendations of this report formed, in large part, the basis of the Parliamentary
Commissioner Act *P.L. 583 1967, which established the Parliamentary Ombudsman.6 The National
Health Service and local authorities were excluded from the Parliamentary Ombudsman's jurisdiction.
The Health Service Reorganisation Act 1973 partly filled this gap, with the appointment of the Health
Service Ombudsman.7 The following year, the Local Government Act provided for the appointment of
ombudsmen to investigate complaints of maladministration against local authorities.
The public sector ombudsman system in England thus consists of three separate schemes. Each
scheme was established under separate legislation, which assumed that any publicly provided
service would be the discrete responsibility of central or local government or the National Health
Service. This assumption is no longer valid, as the focus for public services is now on partnerships
between government departments, local authorities and the health service. A single complaint can
thus cross the jurisdictional boundaries of the ombudsmen. Health care services are an obvious area
of concern,8 but problems can arise in other areas, for example, in relation to special educational
needs9 and housing benefit.10 It can be difficult for consumers to decide to which ombudsman to refer
their complaint, particularly where the complaint is within the jurisdiction of two or more ombudsmen.
The ombudsmen have informal arrangements for ensuring that complaints are routed appropriately,
where necessary, and they sometimes conduct composite investigations. But they have little
flexibility, and these arrangements have developed in spite of the legislation governing the three
schemes.
A further potential source of confusion for consumers is the increasing number of internal complaints
adjudicators within the public sector, encouraged in part by the Citizens' Charter.11 This has led to an
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intermediate layer of complaint handling, by adjudicators, who are funded by the relevant department
or organisation, but who operate independently of them. These schemes include the Adjudicator,12
and the Child Support Agency Independent Case *P.L. 584 Examiner. Local complaints panels were
set up in 1997 to deal with complaints about the Benefits Agency, and an Independent Complaints
Panel was set up in 1999 to deal with complaints about the War Pensions Agency. Ombudsmen in
the public sector are now only one among many schemes for handling complaints.
Complaints handling and redress systems in the public sector in England are thus complicated and
fragmented. This is outmoded in an era of “joined-up” public services. Service delivery is now more
fluid, with greater emphasis on partnerships, in order both to assess client needs better, and also to
deliver services to meet them. The present jurisdictions of the ombudsmen do not sit easily with this
trend. There are jurisdictional issues for the ombudsmen and confusions for consumers.
Towards an integrated service
The Cabinet Office Review recommends a major overhaul of the present system, in order to provide
an integrated system of ombudsmen for the public sector in England.13 The recommendation is for the
establishment of a new Commission, to bring the three ombudsmen together in consolidated
legislation.14 The proposed model is for the present ombudsmen to be combined in a new collegiate
structure,15 with each ombudsman covering the complete jurisdiction, being responsible for his or her
own cases, and not subject to any other ombudsman. No ombudsman would have an appellate
function in relation to the decisions of others. Functional roles, for example, for local government and
the health service could be retained, and would probably predominate in the new structure.16
However, any division of work among the ombudsmen, whether on a functional or regional basis,
would be purely for administrative reasons.17 There would be one chair of the Commission, who
would be responsible for reports to Parliament, management and external representation. The chair
would also be responsible for matters relating to the United Kingdom as a whole, and for reserved
matters in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. However, the Review emphasises the importance of
the *P.L. 585 system having sufficient flexibility, so that it can easily be reshaped, in order to allow for
other functional allocations.18
It is proposed that the new Commission will provide a single gateway for consumers with complaints
about all areas of public service. The internal arrangements for the Commission would be a matter for
the ombudsmen themselves. The Review proposes that the new Commission will be accountable to
Parliament,19 and that its funding arrangements should be the same as those operating for the
Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, where funds are voted by Parliament subject to the
approval of the Treasury.20
Access
The Review proposes that the requirement for complaints to the Parliamentary Ombudsmen to be
referred by an M.P. be abolished. The original proposal that access to the Parliamentary Ombudsman
should be filtered in this way21 was seen as experimental, and it was proposed that it should be
reviewed after five years. The original argument for restricting access was that without it the
ombudsman could be overwhelmed with cases. There was also the feeling that the majority of M.P.s
wanted the member filter.22 This restriction on access has attracted much criticism, and JUSTICE
recommended its removal in 197723 and 1988.24 The Select Committee originally felt that the filter was
advantageous, and saw no reason to abolish it.25 More recently, however, it has supported its
abolition,26 as did most submissions to the Review,27 where “almost universal dissatisfaction with the
arrangement for access” was expressed.28 This restriction is almost unique in the world community of
ombudsmen,29 and the fact that the other public sector ombudsmen in England *P.L. 586 operate
under direct access30 makes this even more anomalous. The recommendation in the Review is
“strongly” in favour of the abolition of the M.P. filter, which “can no longer be sustained in an era of
joined up government”.31 There can be few who will mourn its removal.
At present, complainants to the Health Service Ombudsman must exhaust the NHS internal
complaints procedure before they can refer their case to the ombudsman.32 The Local Government
Ombudsman makes no such stipulation, although the local authority must have had a reasonable
opportunity to respond to the complaint before the Local Government Ombudsman will accept it.33
There is therefore the question as to where the line should be drawn between completely free access
(subject only to the Ombudsman's discretion not to accept a complaint) and some filtering
mechanism. The proposal is for a legislative requirement to use the internal complaints system, but
with discretion for the ombudsmen to override this if it would be unreasonable for the complainant to
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satisfy this requirement.34
The Review makes no detailed proposals about internal complaints systems, recommending that the
specific arrangements for these would be left to the new Commission and the respondent bodies.
Whatever arrangements are made, the internal procedures must not be seen as impediments to
those wishing to complain to the ombudsmen. Moreover, some consistency of approach for the
various public bodies would be beneficial.
Other aspects of access include publicity. The Review proposals for this can be implemented with
immediate effect. For example, it is acknowledged that public awareness of the public sector
ombudsmen needs to be increased.35 In order to facilitate this, a “really first class web site is
essential”, together with electronic access.36 Working practices could also improve access by, for
example, more use being made of telephone contact and meetings.37
Relationships with other complaints bodies
Many complaints bodies interconnect with the ombudsmen, including other public sector statutory
complaints authorities, the ombudsmen in different countries in the United Kingdom, and lower tier
complaints handlers, *P.L. 587 especially independent complaints examiners. The Review suggests
that protocols will have to be established with the ombudsmen in the devolved governments, and with
the Information Commissioner and the Data Protection Commissioner.
The Review looked in particular at the interaction between the proposed Commission and the
independent complaints examiners for central government departments. The Parliamentary
Ombudsman has identified problems with some aspects of the complaints handlers' work, for
example, the failure to distinguish between those cases that can be resolved quickly, by conciliation
or mediation, and those which raise policy issues, or require in-depth investigation. In the former
situation, a brief investigation is suited to the techniques of internal examiners, but the latter cases are
better left for the Parliamentary Ombudsman.38 He is concerned that some of their work may duplicate
or preempt the thorough and independent investigations undertaken by his office.
The Review does not accept the Parliamentary Ombudsman's criticisms. It favours the proliferation of
independent complaints examiners in the public sector, believing that they have an important part to
play in the complaints process. The problems with them concern publicity and collaboration. The
solution is to provide clearer explanations to complainants of the relative roles and status of the
complaints mechanisms, and more information about the remit of adjudicators.39 This process has
already begun. The Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Adjudicator and Independent Case Examiner
are in the process of agreeing working methods, with a view to making it easier for individual
complainants to decide which complaints mechanism to use.40
The Prisons Ombudsman and other ombudsman-like bodies
The Review opted to leave the Prisons Ombudsman outside the new Commission arrangements, on
the basis that this is a “niche” role, is “not established by statute” and is “properly part of the
executive”.41 At present, the Prisons Ombudsman's role is akin to that of an adjudicator, and there are
proposals to put the office on a statutory footing.42 If this were done, the relationship with the new
Commission would need to be addressed. Other “ombudsman-like” bodies in the public sector43 were
also excluded from the Review. It is unfortunate that this review was not used as an opportunity to
assess their roles, with the aim of integrating them within a system of public sector ombudsmen.
Unless this is done, the system will continue to lack coherence, and jurisdictional problems will
continue to arise.
*P.L. 588 The functions of ombudsmen
Ombudsmen have two functions: dispute resolution and improving standards. Most ombudsmen see
the dispute resolution function as the primary role,44 and the Review did not challenge this view,
making it clear that the ombudsmen should retain their “core role of handling complaints”.45 It
accepted that the primary function of the ombudsman is grievance redress for individuals, and many
of the reforms suggested enhance this role.
The procedural reforms are thus designed to make the process more accessible, more flexible, and
more able to cope with increased demand, by, for example, the increased use of informal methods of
resolving disputes.46 The proposals represent a move away from audit-like investigation by
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ombudsmen. The focus for the ombudsmen would be on outcomes, assisting complainants,
informality, and conciliation. The move will be towards more resolution of disputes, but less thorough
investigations, with formal investigations being used as a last resort.47 While this approach will help to
reduce delay, it does not address the problem of systemic failures. In investigating individual cases,
ombudsmen may highlight more generalised weaknesses in practices, rules and attitudes.
Uncovering these weaknesses is of advantage to individuals who have not complained, because the
resulting improvement in the system is a generalised benefit. The ombudsmen are uniquely
positioned in this respect, and this important aspect of their role must not be sacrificed.
Jurisdiction
The Review does not envisage a reduction in jurisdiction, proposing that the present bodies which are
subject to the ombudsmen should remain so.48 How this should be expressed in future legislation is
crucial. The Review rejects the idea that the jurisdictional remit should be expressed in a general term
like “public authority”, preferring a list of generic types, together with a list of some organisations
which may have doubtful status.49 This approach is preferable to the present system, where bodies
are specifically named as within jurisdiction.50 There is a further question about the line to be drawn
between the public and private sector. The existing legislation allows investigation of actions taken by
or “on behalf of” public bodies. The ombudsmen have relied on this phrase to enable them to
investigate complaints about contracted-out services, for example, although it is unclear how far this
can be stretched. The Review proposes that the jurisdictional line should be drawn at the point *P.L.
589 where a service is “largely publicly funded, provides a service to the public and operates within a
detailed specification by a public authority to a demanding performance requirement”.51
There are no recommendations in the Review about the various jurisdictional exclusions in the three
schemes, on the basis that these issues should be decided during the process leading up to
legislation.52 The Review advises against piecemeal extensions to jurisdiction being made before this.
53 Many of the exclusions54 have been criticised, particularly those relating to contractuall and
personnel matters.55 Ombudsmen in the United Kingdom do have a large number of jurisdictional
exclusions as compared with other countries. For example, in Sweden and Denmark there is a
presumption in favour of decisions of public servants being subject to investigation by the
ombudsman, unless there is sound reason to the contrary. This approach, which has been endorsed
by the Select Committee,56 should be considered in any future legislation.
Maladminstration
The remit of the public sector ombudsmen is to provide remedies for maladministration, and the
Review makes no recommendations in relation to this. Maladministration has never been defined in
legislation, but was said to include “bias, neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, ineptitude,
perversity, turpitude, arbitrariness”.57 In 1977, JUSTICE found that the concept of maladministration
was too restrictive.58 Other countries do not confine their ombudsmen to maladministration, but allow
them to investigate unreasonable action by public authorities, or failures of service. However, the
concept has proved to be remarkably flexible, so much so that in 1988 JUSTICE no longer
considered it too restrictive.59
The flexibility of the concept has allowed successive ombudsmen to interpret its meaning liberally,
and to the above list can now be added: “failure to give proper advice, harassment … discrimination
and failure to handle claims to a benefit properly”.60 It can also include a “failure to mitigate the effects
of rigid adherence to the letter of the law where that produces *P.L. 590 manifestly inequitable
treatment”.61 Even a departure from good practice has been held to be maladministration.62
Whether the remit of the ombudsmen should be extended beyond maladministration was not
discussed in the Review.63 It is worth noting that, while the original JUSTICE report64 recommended
that the ombudsman should be confined to investigating alleged maladministration, it had also
recommended the setting up of a comprehensive system of administrative tribunals. In the absence of
this, there is no system for a general appeal on the merits of administrative decisions. This is a
serious drawback. If there were a system of administrative courts, confining the ombudsmen to
maladministration might be justifiable.
An integrated system of administrative law
Although the Review recommends co-operation, collaboration, and “associate” status within the new
Commission for other complaints handlers,65 it essentially accepts the ombudsman's role and function
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as they are at present. It makes some reference to the relationship of the ombudsmen to courts and
tribunals,66 noting that ombudsmen in the public sector were intended to deal with grievances which
were not appropriate to be taken to court.67 Public sector ombudsmen are not alternative dispute
resolution in the accepted sense, nor are they an alternative to tribunals or ministerial appeal.68 The
Review considers that the courts and the ombudsmen should remain quite separate, with the
ombudsman retaining the discretion to investigate cases where there may be a remedy in court, and
the courts not insisting on referrals to the ombudsman.
While it is right that the courts and ombudsmen should not be duplicating each others' work, there are
issues concerning the appropriate roles of the courts, tribunals and ombudsmen in dealing with
citizens' grievances. Some have called for an integrated system of control mechanisms to protect
citizens fully from abuse of administrative power.69 The functions and jurisdictions of the courts,
tribunals and ombudsmen are not immutable, and the “proper *P.L. 591 divide” between their
jurisdiction “must be defined and redefined as circumstances change”.70 The ombudsmen and the
courts are often dealing with similar issues, and this is an opportune time to examine the interface
between them. Equally, it may be appropriate to ask whether the distinction between ombudsmen and
tribunals is appropriate.71 There has recently been a review of the hearing of administrative cases in
the High Court,72 and a review is currently being conducted of the tribunal system.73 If the
ombudsman Review is taken together with these other two reviews, they could be used as a basis for
discussing an integrated system of administrative justice.
Conclusion
The public sector ombudsmen are a success story. They have brought redress to thousands of
consumers and citizens, where none may have been available and they have helped to improve
administrative procedures. Their unique role has enabled them to oversee administrative practice,
and to encourage improvement, for the benefit of citizens. But they have developed piecemeal. The
Cabinet Office Review has therefore made some welcome recommendations, which will make the
ombudsman system more coherent. It also, quite rightly, warns against too much prescription for the
ombudsmen in any future legislation, which should be drafted in general enabling terms. This will
allow the schemes to develop to meet new circumstances.
However, this is not a radical review. A radical review would have discussed the role of the public
sector ombudsmen, and whether their remit was appropriate within the context of other public law
redress systems. This would have placed the ombudsman system within the context of reform of the
system of public law, with the relative strengths and weaknesses of ombudsmen, courts, tribunals and
other institutions being assessed.74 The Review goes some way to airing these issues. It should now
be the starting point for debate of the wider issue--the place of ombudsmen in relation to the
administrative justice system.
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